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On Formal Verification of
Arithmetic-Based Cryptographic Primitives⋆
David Nowak
Research Center for Information Security, AIST, Japan
Abstract. Cryptographic primitives are fundamental for information security: they are used as
basic components for cryptographic protocols or public-key cryptosystems. In many cases, their
security proofs consist in showing that they are reducible to computationally hard problems. Those
reductions can be subtle and tedious, and thus not easily checkable. On top of the proof assis-
tant Coq, we had implemented in previous work a toolbox for writing and checking game-based
security proofs of cryptographic primitives. In this paper we describe its extension with number-
theoretic capabilities so that it is now possible to write and check arithmetic-based cryptographic
primitives in our toolbox. We illustrate our work by machine checking the game-based proofs of
unpredictability of the pseudo-random bit generator of Blum, Blum and Shub, and semantic secu-
rity of the public-key cryptographic scheme of Goldwasser and Micali.
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1 Introduction
Cryptographic primitives are fundamental components for information security. In many cases,
their security proofs consist in showing that they are reducible to computationally hard prob-
lems. Those reductions can be subtle and tedious, and thus not easily checkable. Bellare and
Rogaway even claim in [4] that:
“many proofs in cryptography have become essentially unverifiable. Our field may be
approaching a crisis of rigor.”
As a remedy, they, and also Shoup [16], advocate game-based security proofs. This is a method-
ology for writing proofs which makes them easier to read and check. Halevi goes further by
advocating the need for a software which can deal with the mundane parts of writing and
checking game-based proofs [10].
In the game-based approach, a security property is modeled as a probabilistic program which
implements a game to be solved by the attacker. The attacker itself is modeled as an external
probabilistic procedure interfaced with the game. The goal is then to prove that any attacker
has at most a negligible advantage over a random player. An attacker is assumed to be efficient
i.e., it is modeled as a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm.
Related Work. There are tools such as ProVerif [5], CryptoVerif [6] or the prototype implementa-
tion of [12] which can make automatic proofs of cryptographic protocols or generic cryptographic
schemes. However those tools assume that some secure cryptographic primitives are given. The
security of those primitives cannot be proved automatically. Nevertheless their security proofs
can be checked by a computer.
The game-based proof of the PRP/PRF switching lemma has been formalized in the proof
assistant Coq [1]. Although it is not by itself a cryptographic primitive, this lemma is fundamen-
tal in proving security of some cryptographic schemes. The proof has been made in the random
⋆ This paper is an extended version of [14].
oracle model. The machine formalization in [1] is a so-called deep embedding: games are syn-
tactic objects; and game transformations are syntactic manipulations which can be automated
in the language of the proof assistant. The main advantages of this approach are that one can
prove completeness of decision procedures, if any, and get smaller proof terms. However those
advantages are not exploited in [1]. Moreover this is at the cost of developing a huge machinery
for syntactic manipulations. Two other deep embeddings are currently being developed [2,3].
Previous Work. In cryptographers’ papers, the formal semantics of games is either left implicit
or, at best, informally explained in English. It is not enough for machine formalization. In
previous work, we have (1) proposed a formal semantics for games, (2) implemented it in
the proof assistant Coq, and (3) used it to prove the semantic security of the ElGamal and
Hashed ElGamal public-key cryptographic schemes [13]. Our machine formalization is a so-
called shallow embedding: games are probability distributions (as advocated by Shoup [16]).
Game transformations can still be automated by going through the metalanguage of the proof
assistant. Compared to [1], We have been very careful in making our design choices such that our
implementation remains light. This is an important design issue in formal verification because
formal proofs grow quickly in size when one tackles real-world use-cases.
Our toolbox comes in two layers. The first layer extends the standard library of Coq with
mathematical notions and their properties that are fundamental in cryptography but not avail-
able in the standard library of Coq. This consists of a library for probability distributions,
bitstrings, and a small library for elementary group theory. On top of this, the second layer
consists of formal versions of security definitions and hard problems, and basic game trans-
formations which can be composed to reduce the security of cryptographic primitives to hard
problems.
By using our toolbox, one is forced to exhibit all the steps in his or her game-based proof
and thus cannot hide assumptions or make proofs by intimidation such as “Trivial” or “The
reader may easily supply the details”. In spite of the required level of detail, proofs remain
human readable and human checkable.
Our contributions. We have extended our toolbox in order to be able to deal with cryptographic
primitives based on number theory. For that purpose we have added to the first layer a library
of definitions and lemmas for integers modulo n. In particular we have formalized the notions of
Legendre and Jacobi symbol, Blum primes, and their properties which are of fundamental use
in cryptography. This is already by itself a contribution to the theorem proving community.1
We have also considerably extended and generalized our library on elementary group theory.2
Then we have used our extension to the first layer in adding to the second layer the security
notion of unpredictability, the quadratic residuosity assumption, and number-theoretic game
transformations.
Finally, we have used our extensions to machine check the proof of unpredictability of the
pseudo-random bit generator of Blum, Blum and Shub [7]. We have also machine checked the
proof of semantic security of the public-key cryptographic scheme of Goldwasser and Micali
[8]. Our security proofs of those two primitives are based on the intractability of the quadratic
residuosity problem. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that security proofs
of cryptographic primitives based on number theory are machine checked. This is also the first
time that a proof of unpredictability is machine checked. None of the above mentioned related
1 Tools such as Mathematica can deal with formal computations involving Legendre and Jacobi symbols, but
cannot be used to make formal proofs. In particular they do not allow reasoning by induction.
2 There are more advanced library on group theory, such as [9], but none of them are available with the version
of Coq that we are using (8.2beta3).
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work could be used in their current state to formalize such proofs because they are missing
components for number theory.
Outline. We introduce the proof assistant Coq in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, we give formal meaning
to games in terms of distributions. We give in Sect. 4 the number-theoretic facts that we use
Sect. 5. In Sect. 5.1 we apply our work to the proof of unpredictability of the Blum-Blum-Shub
generator, and in Sect. 5.2 we apply it to the proof of semantic security of the Goldwasser-Micali
scheme. Finally, we briefly describe our implementation in Sect. 6 before concluding in Sect. 7.
2 The Coq proof assistant
Coq is a proof assistant developed at INRIA since 1984.3 It is based on a kernel which takes
a mathematical statement S and proof term p as input and check whether p is a correct proof
of S. On top of this kernel there are: a tactic language which allows to build proof terms in an
incremental way; and decision procedures for decidable fragments such as Presburger arithmetic
or propositional logic.
Coq is goal-directed. This means that if we are trying to prove that a formula Q (the goal)
is true, and we have an already proved theorem stating that P1 & P2 implies Q, then we can
apply this theorem. Coq will replace the goal Q by two subgoals P1 and P2. Proofs by induction
are also possible. We proceed this way until we finally reach goals that are either axioms or are
true by definition. On the way, Coq builds incrementally a proof term to be checked later by
the kernel.
The kernel is the only critical part: if a bug outside the kernel causes a wrong proof term to
be built, it will be rejected by the kernel.
In order to be closer to mathematical practice, Coq also provides mechanisms for introducing
notations, or for inferring implicit parameters and subset coercions. It also comes with a standard
library of definitions and lemmas, for instance on elementary arithmetic, analysis or polymorphic
lists.
3 Games
We denote a game by a finite probability distribution (from now on, we will abbreviate this
term as distribution). A distribution δ over a set S is defined as a finite multiset4 of ordered
pairs from S × R such that ∑(a,p)∈δ p = 1. We use the symbols {| and |} as delimiters of
mutisets not to confuse them with sets. We write p · {|(a1, p1), . . . , (an, pn)|} for the multiset
{|(a1, p · p1), . . . , (an, p · pn)|}.
For convenience, we introduce some notations (cf. Fig. 1) for writing distributions so that
they will look like probabilistic programs:
– We write return a for the distribution with only the element a of probability 1.
– We write x⇐ δ; ϕ(x) for the distribution built by picking at random a value x according
to the distribution δ and then computing the distribution ϕ(x).
– We write x
R← {a1, . . . , an}; ϕ(x) for the distribution built by picking at random a value x
in the set {a1, . . . , an} and then computing the distribution ϕ(x).
– We abbreviate this last case by x← a; ϕ(x) when the set is a singleton {a}.
3 http://coq.inria.fr/
4 A multiset (a.k.a. a bag) is a generalization of a set: a member of a multiset may be member more that once.
For example, the multisets {|1, 2, 2|} and {|1, 2|} are different; and the union of {|1, 2, 2, 3|} and {|1, 4, 4|} is equal
to {|1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 4|}.
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return a = {|(a, 1)|}
x⇐ δ;
ϕ(x)
=
[
(a,p)∈δ
p · ϕ(a)
x
R
← {a1, . . . , an};
ϕ(x)
=
x⇐ {|(a1,
1
n
), . . . , (an,
1
n
)|};
ϕ(x)
x← a;
ϕ(x)
= x
R
← {a};
ϕ(x)
Fig. 1. Notations for distributions
x← a;
ϕ(x)
= ϕ(a)
x⇐ δ;
return x
= δ
y ⇐ (
x⇐ δ;
ϕ(x)
);
ψ(y)
=
x⇐ δ;
y ⇐ ϕ(x);
ψ(y)
Fig. 2. Monad laws
Distributions have a monadic structure [15] and thus satisfy the monad laws (cf. Fig. 2).
Those laws state that our notations for distributions behave well. The first one simply states
that the occurences of a deterministically assigned variable x can be replaced by their definition
(constant propagation). The second one is a kind of η-reduction. The third one allows to simplify
nested sequences.
We write Pr
P (δ) for the probability that P holds of an element picked at random in
the distribution δ. Its value is ∑
(a,p)∈δ s.t. P (a)
p
We define a notion of indistinguishability for distributions. Security definitions, hard problems
and game transformations will all be defined with this relation. Two distributions δ1 and δ2 are
indistinguishable modulo ǫ w.r.t. a predicate P , written δ1 ≡Pǫ δ2, iff:∣∣∣PrP (δ1)
 − PrP (δ2)
∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
≡Pǫ is reflexive and symmetric. If δ1 ≡Pǫ δ2 and δ2 ≡Pǫ′ δ3, then δ1 ≡Pǫ+ǫ′ δ3. If δ1 ≡Pǫ δ2 and
ǫ ≤ ǫ′, then δ1 ≡Pǫ′ δ2. We write ≡ǫ instead of ≡Pǫ when P is the predicate on booleans such
that P (b) holds iff b is equal to true.
Lemma 3.1. If f : S → T is a bijection then, for all ϕ and P ,
x
R← S;
ϕ(f(x))
≡P0 x
R← T ;
ϕ(x)
It is also true when f is a surjective N -to-one function.
This kind of transformation of one game into another one is at the crux of the security proofs
we are dealing with.
4 Some elementary number theory
Let n be a positive number. We write Zn for the set of integers modulo n. The multiplicative
group of Zn is written Z
∗
n and consists of the subset of integers modulo n which are coprime
4
with n. An integer x ∈ Z∗n is a quadratic residue modulo n iff there exists a y ∈ Z∗n such that
y2 ≡ x (mod n). Such a y is called a square root of x modulo n. We write QRn for the set
of quadratic residues modulo n, and QNRn for its complement i.e., the set of quadratic non-
residues modulo n. We write Z∗n(+1) (respectively, QNRn(+1)) for the subset of integers in Z
∗
n
(respectively, QNRn) with Jacobi symbol equal to 1.
The quadratic residuosity problem is the following: given an odd composite integer n, decide
whether or not an x ∈ Z∗n is a quadratic residue modulo n.
Let n be the product of two distinct odd primes p and q. The quadratic residuosity assump-
tion (QRA) states that the above problem is intractable. In our framework, this can be stated
as:
Assumption 4.1 (QRA). For every attacker A′, there exists a negligible ǫ such that
x
R← Z∗n(+1);
b̂⇐ A′(n, x);
b← b̂ = qr(x);
return b
≡ǫ b
R← {true, false};
return b
In the left-side game, an x is picked at random in the set Z∗n(+1); this x is passed with n to the
attacker A′; the attacker returns its guess b̂ for the quadratic residuosity (modulo n) of x; this
guess is compared with the true quadratic residuosity (modulo n) qr(x) of x; and the result b
of this comparison is returned. In the rigth-side game, the result is random. QRA states that
the advantage ǫ of any attacker over a random player is negligible.
Note that the fact that A′ is a randomized algorithm is modeled by the attacker returning
a distribution in which b̂ is picked.
In the security proofs, we will need the following well-known mathematical facts (remember
that n is the product of two distinct odd primes p and q):
Fact I. The function which maps an x ∈ Z∗n to x2 ∈ QRn is a surjective four-to-one function.
Fact II. For any y ∈ QNRn(+1), the function which maps an x ∈ QRn to y · x ∈ QNRn(+1)
is a bijection.
Fact III. |QRn| = |QNRn(+1)|
Fact IV. Z∗n(+1) = QRn ∪QNRn(+1)
Let n be a Blum integer i.e., the product of two distinct prime numbers p and q, each
congruent to 3 modulo 4. In this case, any x ∈ QRn has a unique square root in QRn which we
denote by
√
x and is called the principal square root of x. And we get the following additional
facts [7]:
Fact V. The function which maps an x ∈ QRn to x2 ∈ QRn is a permutation.
Fact VI. The function which maps an x ∈ Z∗n(+1) to x2 ∈ QRn is a surjective two-to-one
function.
Fact VII. For all x ∈ QRn,
√
x2 = x
Fact VIII. For all x ∈ Z∗n(+1), x ∈ QRn ⇔ parity(x) = parity(
√
x2)
5 Applications
In this section, we apply our work to the proofs of unpredictability of the Blum-Blum-Shub
generator, and to the proof of semantic security of the Goldwasser-Micali scheme.
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bbs(len ∈ N, seed ∈ Z∗n) =
bbs rec(len, seed2)
bbs rec(len ∈ N, x ∈ QRn) =
match len with
|0⇒ []
|len′ + 1⇒ parity(x) :: bbs rec(len′, x2)
end
Fig. 3. The Blum-Blum-Shub generator
5.1 The Blum-Blum-Shub pseudorandom bit generator
The security of many cryptographic systems depends upon a cryptographic primitive for the
generation of unpredictable sequences of bits. They are used to generate keys, nonces or salts.
Ideally, those sequences of bits should be random, that is, generated by successive flips of a fair
coin. In practice, one uses a pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG) which, given a short seed,
generates a long sequence of bits that appears random. For the purpose of simulation, one only
requires of a PRBG that it passes certain statistical tests (cf. Chapter 3 of [11]). This is not
enough for cryptography. A PRBG is cryptographically secure iff it passes all polynomial-time
statistical tests: roughly speaking, no polynomial-time algorithm can distinguish between an
output sequence of the generator and a truly random sequence.
In [7], the Blum-Blum-Shub generator (BBS) is proved left-unpredictable (under the quadratic
residuosity assumption). It was proved by Yao in [18] that this is equivalent to stating that BBS
passes all polynomial-time statistical tests. It is shown in [17] that BBS is still secure under the
weaker assumption that n is hard to factorize. The same authors also show that, for sufficiently
large n, more than one bit can be extracted at each iteration of the algorithm. However, in this
paper, we stick to the original proof of [7].
Let n = p · q be a Blum integer. The BBS generator is defined by the function bbs given in
Fig. 3 which takes as input a length and a seed, and returns a pseudorandom sequence of bits
of the required length.
In our framework, one can state the left-unpredictability of bbs by the following definition.
Definition 5.1 (Left-unpredictability). bbs is left-unpredictable iff for all length len, for
every attacker A, there exists a negligible ǫ such that
seed
R← Z∗n;
[b0, . . . , blen]← bbs(len + 1, seed);
b̂0 ⇐ A([b1, . . . , blen]);
b← b̂0 = b0;
return b
≡ǫ b
R← {true, false};
return b
In the left-side game, a seed is picked at random in the set Z∗n; the function bbs is then used to
compute a pseudorandom sequence of bits [b0, . . . , blen] of length len + 1; this sequence minus
its first bit b0 is passed to the attacker A; the attacker returns its guess b̂0 for the value of the
bit b0; this guess is compared with b0; and the result b of this comparison is returned. bbs is
left-unpredictable if the advantage ǫ of any attacker over a random player is negligible.
Before proving that bbs is left-unpredictable, we show that it can be reduced to the problem
of finding the parity of a random quadratic residue modulo n.
Lemma 5.2. If, for every attacker A′, there exists a negligible ǫ such that
x
R← QRn;
b̂⇐ A′(n, x);
b← b̂ = parity(√x);
return b
≡ǫ b
R← {true, false};
return b
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then bbs is left-unpredictable.
In the left-side game, x is picked at random in the set QRn; this x is passed with n to
the attacker A′; the attacker returns its guess b̂ for the parity of
√
x; this guess is compared
with the true parity of
√
x; and the result b of this comparison is returned. The above lemma
states that if the advantage ǫ of any attacker over a random player is negligible, then bbs is
left-unpredictable.
Proof (of Lemma 5.2). We proceed by rewriting the left-side game of the left-unpredictability
specification (Def. 5.1).
BBS1. We unfold the definition of bbs:
seed
R← Z∗n;
[b0, . . . , blen]← bbs rec(len+ 1, seed2);
b̂0 ⇐ A([b1, . . . , blen]);
b← b̂0 = b0;
return b
BBS2. Because of Fact I, we can rewrite the game as:
x
R← QRn;
[b0, . . . , blen]← bbs rec(len+ 1, x);
b̂0 ⇐ A([b1, . . . , blen]);
b← b̂0 = b0;
return b
BBS3. x is a quadratic residue, we can thus replace x with
√
x2 (according to Fact VII).
x
R← QRn;
[b0, . . . , blen]← bbs rec(len + 1,
√
x2);
b̂0 ⇐ A([b1, . . . , blen]);
b← b̂0 = b0;
return b
BBS4. Because of Fact V, we can rewrite the game as:
x
R← QRn;
([b0, . . . , blen])← bbs rec(len + 1,
√
x);
b̂0 ⇐ A([b1, . . . , blen]);
b← b̂0 = b0;
return b
BBS5. By unfolding one step of bbs rec, we get:
x
R← QRn;
[b1, . . . , blen]← bbs rec(len, x);
b̂0 ⇐ A([b1, . . . , blen]);
b← b̂0 = parity(
√
x);
return b
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BBS6. We have reduced the game to the left-side one of the hypothesis where the attacker
A′(n, x) is instantiated by:
[b1, . . . , blen]← bbs rec(len, x);
b̂0 ⇐ A([b1, . . . , blen]);
return b̂0 ⊓⊔
Using the above lemma, we can now prove that bbs is left-unpredictable.
Theorem 5.3. bbs is left-unpredictable (under the quadratic residuosity assumption).
Proof. By Lemma 5.2, we only need to prove that for every attacker A:
x
R← QRn;
b̂⇐ A(n, x);
b← b̂ = parity(√x);
return b
≡ǫ b
R← {true, false};
return b
We proceed by rewriting the left-side game.
BBS7. Because of Fact VI, we can rewrite the game as:
x
R← Z∗n(+1);
b̂⇐ A(n, x2);
b← b̂ = parity(
√
x2);
return b
BBS8. By Fact VIII, we can replace the equality test b̂ = parity(
√
x2) by b̂⊕parity(x)⊕1 = qr(x)
(where ⊕ is the notation for the exclusive-or XOR).
x
R← Z∗n(+1);
b̂⇐ A(n, x2);
b← b̂⊕ parity(x)⊕ 1 = qr(x);
return b
BBS9. We have reduced the game to the left-sided one of QRA (Assumption 4.1) where the
attacker A′(n, x) is instantiated by:
b̂⇐ A(n, x2);
return b̂⊕ parity(x)⊕ 1 ⊓⊔
5.2 The Goldwasser-Micali public-key cryptographic scheme
The Goldwasser-Micali public-key cryptographic scheme (GM) was the first probabilistic one
which was provably secure. More precisely it is semantically secure under the quadratic residu-
osity assumption [8]. For defining GM , we need a number n which is the product of two distinct
prime numbers p and q, and a y ∈ QNRn(+1). It is then defined by the three functions given in
Fig. 4 where
(
c
p
)
denotes the Legendre symbol of c.
In our framework, one can state the semantic security of the above scheme by the following
definition.
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keygen() =
pk ← (n, y);
sk ← (p, q);
return (pk, sk)
encrypt((n, y) ∈ Z× Z∗n, b ∈ {0, 1}) =
x
R
← Z∗n;
c← (if b = 1 then y · x2 else x2);
return c
decrypt((p, q) ∈ Z× Z, c ∈ Z∗n) =
e←
“
c
p
”
;
m← (if e = 1 then 0 else 1);
return m
Fig. 4. The Goldwasser-Micali scheme
Definition 5.4. GM is semantically secure iff, for every attacker (A1, A2), there exists a neg-
ligible ǫ such that
(pk, sk)⇐ keygen();
(m1,m2)⇐ A1(pk);
i
R← {1, 2};
c⇐ encrypt(pk,mi);
ı̂⇐ A2(pk, (m1,m2), c);
return ı̂ = i
≡ǫ b
R← {true, false};
return b
In the left-side game, a pair (pk, sk) of public and secret keys is generated; the public key pk
is passed to the attacker A1 which returns two messages m1 and m2; one of them is picked at
random and encrypted with the secret key sk; the obtained cyphertext c is then passed with
the public key pk and the pair of picked messages (m1,m2) to the attacker A2; the attacker
returns its guess for the picked message; whether the attacker is right or not is returned as a
result. A scheme is semantically secure if the advantage ǫ of any attacker over a random player
is negligible.
Theorem 5.5. The scheme of Goldwasser and Micali is semantically secure (under the quadratic
residuosity assumption).
Proof. We proceed by rewriting the left-side game of the semantic-security specification (Def. 5.4).
GM1. We unfold definitions of keygen and encrypt:
(m1,m2)⇐ A1(n, y);
i
R← {1, 2};
x
R← Z∗n;
ı̂⇐ A2((n, y), (m1,m2), if mi = 1 then y · x2 else x2);
return ı̂ = i
GM2. Because of Fact I, we can rewrite the game as:
(m1,m2)⇐ A1(n, y);
i
R← {1, 2};
x
R← QRn;
ı̂⇐ A2((n, y), (m1,m2), if mi = 1 then y · x else x);
return ı̂ = i
9
GM3. Because of Fact II, we can rewrite the game as:
(m1,m2)⇐ A1(n, y);
i
R← {1, 2};
x
R← QRn;
z
R← QNRn(+1);
ı̂⇐ A2((n, y), (m1,m2), if mi = 1 then z else x);
return ı̂ = i
Note that this transformation is only valid because the result of the game does not
depend on the relation between y · x and x. Indeed, if mi = 1 then only y · x is used
while x can be ignored, and vice versa.
Now we consider the different cases for the messages m1 and m2 chosen by the attacker.
(i) (m1,m2) = (0, 0):
GM4. We can rewrite the game as:
x
R← QRn;
z
R← QNRn(+1);
ı̂⇐ A2((n, y), (0, 0), x);
i
R← {1, 2};
return ı̂ = i
i can be picked randomly after the calls to the attacker. Therefore ı̂ does not
depend on i. Our goal is proved.
(ii) (m1,m2) = (1, 1): This is similar to the previous case except that A2 is given z instead of
x.
(iii) (m1,m2) = (0, 1):
GM5. We can rewrite the game GM3 as:
i
R← {1, 2};
if i = 1 then
x
R← QRn;
ı̂⇐ A2((n, y), (0, 1), x);
return ı̂ = i
else
z
R← QNRn(+1);
ı̂⇐ A2((n, y), (0, 1), z);
return ı̂ = i
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GM6. By definition of qr, we can rewrite the game as:
i
R← {1, 2};
if i = 1 then
x
R← QRn;
ı̂⇐ A2((n, y), (0, 1), x);
b̂← ı̂ = 1;
return b̂ = qr(x)
else
z
R← QNRn(+1);
ı̂⇐ A2((n, y), (0, 1), z);
b̂← ı̂ = 1;
return b̂ = qr(z)
GM7. Because of Fact III, we can rewrite the game as:
x
R← QRn ∪QNRn(+1);
ı̂⇐ A2((n, y), (0, 1), x);
b̂← ı̂ = 1;
return b̂ = qr(x)
GM8. Because of Fact IV, we can rewrite the game as:
x
R← Z∗n(+1);
ı̂⇐ A2((n, y), (0, 1), x);
b̂← ı̂ = 1;
return b̂ = qr(x)
GM9. We have reduced the game to the left-side one of QRA (Assumption 4.1) where
the attacker A′(n, x) is instantiated by:
ı̂⇐ A2((n, y), (0, 1), x);
b̂← î = 1;
return b̂
(iv) (m1,m2) = (1, 0): This case is similar to the previous one. ⊓⊔
6 Implementation
We have extended our toolbox with a module which contains number-theoretic lemmas on
Legendre and Jacobi symbols, and on Blum integers. Based on those lemmas, we have proved
arithmetic-based game transformations in the module dedicated to transformations. We have
added the definition of unpredictability and the quadratic residuosity assumption in the appro-
priate modules. We have then used those extensions to make the formal security proofs of the
Blum-Blum-Shub generator and the Goldwasser-Micali scheme.
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Future work. Two standard mathematical results remain to be proved in the proof assistant
Coq. The first one is Fermat’s little theorem. Although there are proofs of this theorem in
the contributions of Coq, they are not compatible with its standard library. The second one is
the fact that if p is a prime number then the group Z∗p is cyclic. Although those theorems are
orthogonal to our work, it would be nice to have them machine checked, if only for the sake of
completeness. For the moment, we have added them as axioms.
We neither compute exact nor asymptotic running time. This is orthogonal to the verification
of game transformations. In the examples we dealt with, the algorithm A′ we built from the
attacker A at the end of Lemma 5.2, Theorem 5.3 and Theorem 5.5 are trivially PPT and thus
valid attackers. However this is not checked by the current implementation.
7 Conclusions
We have extended our toolbox with number-theoretic capabilities. It is thus now possible to
use this toolbox for machine-checking game-based proofs of arithmetic-based cryptographic
primitives. We have shown usability of our implementation by applying it to the proof of
unpredictability of the Blum-Blum-Shub generator and the proof of semantic security of the
Goldwasser-Micali scheme. This is the first time that a proof of unpredictability is machine
checked. Machine formalization has forced us to make clear all details in those proofs that are
usually either left to the reader or roughly explained in English. In spite of this level of details,
we claim that our proofs remain human readable and are mechanically human checkable without
appealing too much to intuition.
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